Ethical Hedonism, Consent, & Antinatalism

You may also be interested in 

• Constructive Complexity, or Posthuman Ethics and Value Systems, which explains hedons, terminal values, and the idea of constructive complexity. 
• Constructive Complexity: Follow-up Notes

Today we're going to talk about

• What hedonism is
• Why "consent" is integral to any form of hedonism that we can coexist with
• How this means that hedonists must also be antinatalists

I. Definitions

Merriam-Webster says that hedonism is "the belief that pleasure or happiness is the most important goal in life."

And Wikipedia says this: "Hedonism is a school of thought that argues that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. In very simple terms, a hedonist strives to maximize net pleasure (pleasure minus pain)."

To be clear about what we're talking about, since some people may define happiness and pleasure differently (one definition I found said that it was the experience fulfilling desires, which could be used to create a kind of hedonism that very few would recognize as such), we will say that pleasure is connected to endorphins.

There are different flavors of hedonism. They possess the same terminal value but they don't all carry the same assumptions about how to best fulfill this value. This is why there was some point to speaking, in the post mentioned above, about a constructive complexity-centered value system rather than a pure complexity-centered system.

One flavor, your cardboard strawman edgy-fifteen-year-old-slacker-punk flavor, would hold that you should consider the fulfillment of your values in the short term. Whatever gives you maximum hedons right now is the best option to take.

Another flavor is that espoused by Epicurus and most other hedonists: consider the fulfillment of your values in the long term. Getting onto crack may give you oodles of hedons today but it is not sustainable, will not give you as many hedons in the long run as abstaining.

These are flavors that rest on how far into the future you should look when decided what fulfills your values. They can be mixed with other flavors. For example, most types of hedonism include a universalist focus: you have to consider other people's hedons and dolors (pain units) as you consider your own. Even if torture grants you hedons, it is unapprovable because generates dolors for the other party.

II. Consent

There is another flavor that must be considered, which rests on consent. Basically, whether you are permitted to do whatever it takes to increase a person's hedon count and decrease their dolors (including/especially changing their value system) even if you don't have their consent to do it.

I'm not going to say that non-consensual hedonism (noncon-hedon?) is objectively wrong or right. What I will say is this: You can divide the world into (1) non-con hedonists, (2) all other hedonists, (3) non-hedonists who nevertheless think that forcing your will on others is okay regardless of what that will is, and (4) everybody else.

Group 3 will find that nothing really objectionable is going on when the non-con hedonists get to forcing hedonism on everybody. That's how they think the world should work, those with the power to enforce their will, doing so. Group 2 won't mind on their own account, probably, but may be divided on whether they're really concerned with the consent of others in all situations or only in situations which involve their own actions (the difference between "committing murder" and "letting die").

Group 4, however, cannot abide the non-con hedonists. By definition, none of Group 4's value systems are the one which the non-con hedonists will enforce when and where they have the ability to enforce it. This is a problem because Group 4 values their agency as well.

In other words, non-con hedonists can't coexist with Group 4, because non-con hedonists are a direct threat against the ability of anyone in Group 4 to maintain and fulfill per existing values.

III. Antinatalism

Let's ignore non-hedonists from here on out. They're a pretty threatening group and we can't safely coexist with them.

Of the hedonists that remain we can say this: They should not support the creation of new humans. Perhaps of any life at all, depending on how far their hedonism extends. (We should not confuse this with a desire to prematurely end life)

In Life, Death, and Meaning, David Benatar gives the following argument:

1. The presence of pain is bad.
2. The presence of pleasure is good.
3. The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone. 
4. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is deprivation. 

I would personally contest it but in the context of hedonism this argument checks out.

Schopenhauer adds:

Whoever wants summarily to test the assertion that the pleasure in the world outweighs the pain, or at any rate that the two balance each other, should compare the feelings of an animal that is devouring another with those of that other. 

Now, an obligation to "potential future persons" can exist, but only in the context that one may reasonably expect them to exist. In deciding whether to leave a wasted world to potential future persons there is a moral obligation to act one way and not another, but in deciding whether to actualize these potential future persons there is none. That is, moral obligation is predicated on the idea that these persons will exist, and by deciding that they will not... they will not.

And, just to make sure we're clear here, potential future persons do not currently exist. That is what makes them "potential" and "future." Their pain, their pleasure, does not currently exist. But we can expect it to exist (because they will have experiences) if we make them exist. This, then, makes us indirectly but no less strongly responsible for their pain and pleasure. And as the pain in any life will outweigh its pleasure, this makes us responsible for further weighting the universe in the direction of pain over pleasure.